Since 1991, risk-adjusted premium subsidies have existed in the Dutch social health insurance sector, which covered about two-thirds of the population until 2006. In 2002, pharmacy-based cost groups (PCGs) were included in the demographic risk adjustment model, which improved the goodness-of-fit, as measured by the R 2 , to 11.5%. The model's R 2 reached 22.8% in 2004, when inpatient diagnostic information was added in the form of diagnostic cost groups (DCGs). PCGs and DCGs appear to be complementary in their ability to predict future costs. PCGs particularly improve the R 2 for outpatient expenses, whereas DCGs improve the R 2 for inpatient expenses. In 2006, this system of risk-adjusted premium subsidies was extended to cover the entire population.
Health care reforms in many countries seek to combine efficiency and equity. Equity refers to the principle that high-risk individuals should receive a subsidy to increase their access to health insurance coverage to guarantee that the total population has access to care independent of one's financial situation. Risk adjustment is used to calculate the expected expenditures of individual patients over a fixed period of time and set premium subsidies to patients (or the sickness fund to which they belong). In the 1990s, risk adjustment in social health insurance was introduced in 11 (mainly European) countries, including the Netherlands ( Van de Ven and Ellis 2000) .
In most countries, risk adjustment is based on demographic variables only . Both the 2000 introduction of diagnostic cost groups (DCGs) for Medicare in the United States (Pope et al. 2000) and the 2002 introduction of pharmacy-based cost groups (PCGs) in the Netherlands (Lamers and van Vliet 2002) proved to be major steps toward health-based risk adjustment. On Jan. 1, 2004, a second health adjuster, DCGs, was introduced into the risk adjustment model for the Dutch social health insurance system.
The importance of PCGs and DCGs has increased considerably as a consequence of the expansion of risk adjustment to the entire Dutch population on Jan. 1, 2006. Up to that date, the mandatory social health insurance system had been restricted to the approximate two-thirds of the population who had on average the lowest incomes, poorer health status, and higher health care expenditures than the remaining part of the population covered through private health insurance. A demographic risk adjustment model would not have been sufficient to bridge the gap in average expenditures between these two in-surance systems. Such a model would have seriously jeopardized the move toward a unified health insurance system covering the whole population because under those circumstances there would not have been a level playing field between the (former) sickness funds and (former) private health insurance companies.
The purpose of this paper is to describe the research for the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports (Van Vliet and Prinsze 2003) that led to the introduction of DCGs in the risk adjustment system for Dutch social health insurance. We investigated whether chronically ill patients could be identified based on inpatient diagnostic information. DCGs should be complementary to PCGs, which already were in the 2003 model. Based on the results of the study presented in this article, DCGs were introduced into the risk adjustment model in 2004; the accompanying reexamination of the PCGs resulted in a reduction from 13 to 12 PCGs.
The next two sections briefly describe the Dutch health care and health insurance system, and the development of the risk adjustment system in the Netherlands. These are followed by a description of the data and methods used for the statistical analysis, and the results of the analysis. The paper concludes with a summary of the main findings.
The Health Care System and Health Insurance System in the Netherlands
Total health care expenditures in the Netherlands were about 9.3% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2005. Around 15% of total health care expenditures is financed through general taxation. The financing of health and sick leave payments is separate from health care insurance.
Health care delivery in the Netherlands is characterized by a sharp distinction between general practitioners (GPs) and medical specialists. The GP performs an important role as a gatekeeper to the rest of the health care delivery system. In principle, each individual has free choice of a physician (GP and medical specialist). The health insurance system in the Netherlands is divided into three compartments: Until 2006, the second compartment of the health insurance system was divided between compulsory sickness fund insurance-for people in the lowest income brackets (64% of the population)-and (mainly) voluntary private health insurance. Since 2006, everyone is obliged to buy individual health insurance with a legally described, basic benefits package from one of the (former) sickness funds or private insurers. Adults 18 and older pay a community-rated premium (on average about 1,050 Euros [$1,470 U.S.] per year in 2006) to the insurer of their choice, who also receives risk-adjusted premiums from the Risk Equalization Fund. The latter is supplied with mandatory incomedependent contributions (6.5% of income up to 30,600 Euros [$42,840 U.S.]), as well as a subsidy from the government to cover children under age 18, for whom no premium is due. Employers are legally obligated to compensate employees for their incomedependent contributions. 1 According to the Health Insurance Act, the sum of these contributions equals about 50% of total insurers' revenues.
During the annual open enrollment season, health insurers must accept every applicant, irrespective of health status, for the basic insurance. There are about 33 insurers (riskbearing entities), which are privately managed; some are for-profit, others are nonprofit. Of these, 23 have formed four conglomerates (as of 2007; consolidation continues). An insurer is required to quote the same premium to all of its enrollees (save for rebates in case of a voluntary deductible or group insurance); however, premiums vary among insurers.
The basic benefits package gives coverage for hospital care (up to one year), care provided by general practitioners and medical specialists, prescription drugs, maternity care, obstetrics, technical aids, some physiotherapy, and some basic dental care. Benefits can be either in-kind-that is, bills associated with medical consumption are paid directly by the insurer to the provider-or on a reimbursement basis. The former is a continuation of the previous sickness fund practice; the latter stems from the previous private insurance practice.
In 1991, risk-adjusted premium subsidies were introduced in the then-sickness fund insurance. The simple risk adjustment model used at the time has undergone several improvements over the past 15 years, as reported in various articles (Van de Ven et al. 1994; van Barneveld et al. 2001; Lamers and van Vliet 2003; Van de Ven, van Vliet, and Lamers 2004) . The version described in this paper formed the basis for the risk adjustment model that has been used since 2006, when the new Health Insurance Act came into force.
The empirical analyses in this paper are based on data originating from the (former) sickness fund sector. However, the results and conclusions are just as relevant now that risk adjustment has been extended to cover the whole population. In fact, one may say that the health-based model developed here helped facilitate the merger of the two insurance sectors because it (nearly) bridged the gap in average expenditures between these sectors.
As already noted, this gap could not have been closed by a demographic model alone, which would have seriously jeopardized the introduction of the unified health insurance system; in that situation, the (former) sickness funds would have been at a financial disadvantage, while the opposite would have occurred for the (former) private insurance companies.
The Risk Adjustment and Risk-Sharing System
Risk-adjusted premiums aim to compensate insurers for individuals' expected costs, that is, for their expected need of health care. Thus, chronically ill patients should not result in predictable losses and become unwanted clients for insurers (Van de Ven and Ellis 2000) . In 2001, the premium subsidies were based on age interacted with sex, eligibility status interacted with age, and degree of urbanization. Before 2006, eligibility status was the compulsory basis for enrollment with a sickness fund-for example, earning a salary below a certain threshold, receiving a disability allowance or unemployment benefit, or being a pensioner with a low income. Since 2006, this risk adjuster has been replaced by ''the main source of income,'' identifying almost the same categories.
Because it was believed that (ex ante) risk adjustment still was inadequate, the system has-from the beginning-been supplemented with extensive (ex post) risk sharing (Lamers, van Vliet, and van de Ven 2003) . This varies according to the degree to which sickness funds supposedly were able to influence three cost components: the costs of outpatient care, the variable costs of inpatient care (production dependent costs), and fixed hospital costs (production independent costs). For example, in 2002, 35% of the losses or profits that individual sickness funds made on their risk adjustment payment for outpatient care were shared across all sickness funds (Table 1) . This implies that from any (efficiency) gains of 100 euros by a sickness fund, 35 euros were taken away afterward (the opposite would hold for losses). Thus, sickness funds were at financial risk for outpatient care of 65% (5 100%-35%). For the variable costs of inpatient care, this percentage was 25%, and for fixed hospital costs, 5%. Table 1 shows that the improvement of the risk adjustment system made it possible to increase the financial risk of the sickness funds over the years from 3% in 1993 to 53% in 2004 (Van de Ven, van Vliet, and Lamers 2004) .
Risk adjustment and risk sharing require a dynamic process of continuously improving and updating the system. Changes in the Dutch system are based partly on research, partly on political arguments, and partly on pressure from health insurers. In the Netherlands, four criteria appear to be used for evaluating changes in the risk adjustment and risk-sharing system: 1) procedural fairness (i.e., the extent of influence of health insurers on various cost components); 2) the redistributive effects at health insurer level (i.e., the range over all health insurers of the differences between actual and predicted per capita expenses); 3) feasibility; and 4) appropriateness of incentives (e.g., avoiding incentives for risk selection and stimulating efficiency). In practice, the redistributive effects appear to be the dominant criterion.
Toward Health-Based Risk Adjustment
It has been shown that inpatient diagnostic information (Ash et al. 1989; Lamers 1997) , ambulatory care diagnoses (Weiner et al. 1996) , and/or information about chronic conditions deduced from the prior use of prescribed drugs (Clark et al. 1995; Pope et al. 2000) may improve substantially the predictive accuracy of risk adjustment models. It also has been shown that in the Dutch social health insurance system, DCGs can improve the risk adjustment model based on demographic adjusters only (Lamers 1998) or the model containing PCGs (Lamers and van Vliet 2002) .
In 2002, pharmacy-based cost groups, which are based on outpatient pharmacy information, were introduced into the Dutch risk adjustment system. Adding PCGs to the demographic model greatly increased the predictive accuracy. The R 2 nearly doubled, in particular as a result of a better prediction of outpatient expenses. Anatomic Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) Classification codes that are indicative of 28 chronic conditions, as distinguished by the revised Chronic Disease Score (CDS) (Clark et al. 1995) , were investigated. Validation of the classification in chronic conditions and adaptation of the classification to the Dutch situation resulted in 22 chronic conditions with relevant ATC codes. Drugs that treat depression, psychosis and anxiety, and mental illnesses were excluded because the treatment of these chronic diseases occurs primarily in the first, rather than the second, compartment. Only drugs prescribed predominantly-that is, in more than 50% of the cases-for treating the chronic conditions concerned were consid- ered to be indicative. Further, prescriptions had to exceed more than 180 defined daily doses (DDD) in the base year to assign an enrollee to a chronic condition.
To mitigate the potential for further gaming possibilities, a hierarchy was imposed on the chronic conditions by iteratively ranking them on highest additional costs compared to costs expected on the basis of age and gender alone (Lamers and van Vliet 2003) . Enrollees were assigned to the most expensive condition only. Chronic conditions with the lowest additional costs (i.e., coefficients predictive of less than the mean expenditures) were excluded. This resulted in 13 PCGs as risk adjusters in the 2002/2003 risk adjustment model (approximately 240 ATC codes). After the revision in 2004, only 12 PCGs remained as risk adjusters (134 ATC codes). The former PCG for stomach diseases was excluded because of the extensive and increasing off-label usage of the drugs for these diseases.
This paper describes the empirical research that led to the 2004 introduction of DCGs in the Dutch risk adjustment model. A previous study on data from one sickness fund (Lamers and van Vliet 2002) already had shown the improvement in predictive performance when a PCG model was extended with a risk adjuster based on diagnostic information from previous hospitalizations. Now the question was how to define such a risk adjuster precisely, and in view of the probable overlap with PCGs, what its performance would be when applied to data covering the entire Dutch social health insurance sector.
Data and Methods
The empirical analyses in this paper are based on administrative data at the individual level for enrollees of 24 sickness funds operating in the Dutch social health insurance sector in 2001 (10.2 million enrollees, or 99.5% of the market). All analyses were done at the individual level. 2000); these are used in conjunction with the discharge diagnoses.
To enable implementation and mitigate gaming possibilities, patients were assigned to only one PCG-the most expensive one. Therefore, PCGs were ranked on the highest additional cost (in 2001) compared to the expected cost, corrected for age and gender, of those patients not assigned to any PCG. Furthermore, patients were assigned to PCGs when more than 180 DDDs were prescribed in one calendar year (2000); PCGs with the lowest additional costs were excluded.
Patients were assigned to DCGs according to inpatient diagnostic information, analogous to the DCG model by Pope et al. (2000) . Thus, based on clinical similarities and the number of hospitalizations, the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes (about 15,000) were clustered into 172 groups of diagnoses (Dxg) as specified by Pope et al. (2000) for inpatient admissions. Also, to lessen gaming possibilities, only hospitalizations of two days and more were counted.
In order to adjust the model to the Dutch health care system, a team of medical experts reviewed the diagnosis groups. This review led to exclusion of 105 of the 172 groups for such reasons as:
% the illness was less serious or acute and the expected future costs low; % the diagnosis normally was not the reason for admission; % the diagnosis was vague or not unequivocally for a single illness; % the disorder or complaint usually was treated in an outpatient department.
Four special medical procedures (chemotherapy, radiotherapy, hemodialysis, and athome artificial respiration) were considered as well since they are indicators for chronic diseases underrepresented in the National Medical Registration. Consequently, the ICD-9-CM codes for clinical chemotherapy and radiotherapy were excluded to prevent duplication. This resulted in 69 Dxgs, including the four special medical procedures.
Diagnoses were ranked as already explained. Subsequently, the 69 ranked groups were clustered statistically by means of the Ward method (Ward 1963) into 13 DCGs based on average additional costs. This clustering accounts for 99.5% of the differences in average additional costs between the 69 Dxgs, implying that distinguishing the 13 DCGs provides virtually the same predictive performance as distinguishing the original 69 Dxgs separately.
Ranking and Prevalence of the (New) Pharmacy-Based Cost Groups
Before the addition of the DCGs as a risk adjuster, the PCGs were revised and ranked again. A new PCG for neuromuscular diseases was added. The PCG for cancer was removed since the prevalence was very low (.1 per 1,000) and it was expected that cancer would be covered by the DCGs that included such diagnosis groups as radiotherapy, chemotherapy, and many cancer diagnoses. In addition, the PCG for stomach disorders (prevalence 33.3 per 1,000) was removed because of the extensive off-label use of prescription medication, both in dosage and number of prescriptions. Finally, some drugs were excluded for certain PCGs since the drugs were not used predominantly for the diseases for which they were developed. Due to these revisions, the prevalence of people assigned to a PCG dropped from 100.8 to 69.7 per 1,000 enrollees ( Table 2 ). The number of prescriptions included in the PCGs was about 12% of the 88.5 million prescriptions for the sickness fund enrollees in 2000.
Prevalence of Diagnosis Cost Groups
Two steps were taken to mitigate potential gaming possibilities. First, all enrollees were assigned to only one-the most expensivediagnosis group. Second, clustering diagnosis groups in DCGs on the basis of average costs (corrected for age, gender, and PCGs), resulted in DCGs that were not clinically identifiable. The prevalence of DCGs was 20.3 per 1,000 (Table 3 ). Both the total DCG prevalence and the prevalence of the 13 DCGs appeared relatively stable in 2000 and 2001.
Models
Both PCGs and DCGs-defined on data from 2000-were introduced as dummy variables in ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, with expenditures in 2001 as the dependent variable. The complete set of independent variables comprised 95 dummies:
% age*gender (19*2 dummies, minus 1 for the reference category); % eligibility status *age (24 dummies); % region (nine dummies); % PCGs (12 dummies, reference category is: no PCG); % DCGs (13 dummies, reference category is: no DCG).
Evaluation of the models is by way of R 2 and predictive ratios for subgroups. The four models (Table 5 ) are linear and estimated separately for inpatient and outpatient care (without fixed hospital costs). To determine the total variance explained, the expected costs were calculated as the sum of the expected costs of inpatient and outpatient care. The predictive ratio (expected costs/ actual costs) for four subgroups (yes/no DCG and yes/no PCG) also were evaluated. Table 4 shows that only .8% of the patients was assigned to both a PCG and a DCG. Overlap of PCGs and DCGs led to the identification of matching diseases and diagnoses. For example, PCG1 (chronic obstructive pulmonary disease [COPD] including asthma) occurred simultaneously with diagnosis group 105 (COPD). The biggest overlaps were for HIV/AIDS (PCG11 and diagnosis group 3) and for renal diseases (PCG12 and diagnosis group 115). Clustering of DCGs corrected for age, gender, and PCG resulted in a relatively low placement of HIV in the DCG ranking. The prevalence of the PCG for renal disease is at present very low (.04 per 1,000 insured), but is expected to rise in the near future due to new and promising drugs. Simultaneous estimation of the coefficients limited the (potential) overcompensa-tion for renal diseases (PCG13), as illustrated by the drop of its coefficient from 25,257 euros in the PCG model to 16,155 euros in the PCG+DCG model (see Table 7 ). 2 Patients assigned to both a PCG and a DCG seemed to be in worse health than patients assigned to either a PCG or a DCG. The average cost of these patients was 8,070 euros, whereas the average cost for patients assigned to only a PCG was 3,152 euros, and for patients assigned to only a DCG, 5,094 euros (see Table 4 ). Thus, on average, assigning patients to both a PCG and a DCG did not result in (substantial) overcompensation. Table 5 shows the predictive accuracy of the models. Adding the PCGs to the demographic model resulted in an increase in R 2 from 6.5% to 11.8%. The major revision of the PCG model caused a slight decrease in R 2 (to 11.5%), probably due to the exclusion of the PCG for stomach disorders. Adding the DCGs to the model doubled the R 2 . The new model particularly improved the predictive accuracy for inpatient expenses (from 4.3% to 15.6%), but the predictive accuracy for outpatient expenses also improved from 23.7% to 27.1%. Table 6 shows that the predictive ratio (expected costs/actual costs) for people assigned to a DCG but not to a PCG is only .77. Introduction of DCGs to the model Note: Patients with prescriptions (more than 180 DDD) for two or more PCGs are counted only in the most expensive PCG. PCG 5 pharmacy-based cost group; COPD 5 chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; ASCVD 5 atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease; CHF 5 congestive heart failure; ESRD 5 end-stage renal disease. increased the predictive ratio to .99. The predictive ratio for people assigned to both a PCG and a DCG is .89 in the PCG model, whereas there is a very small overcompensation for them in the PCG+DCG model (predictive ratio 1.01). A method was developed to obtain the diagnosis at the time of hospital discharge to calculate capitation payments. Merging administrative data on hospitalizations from the sickness funds with the Dutch National Medical Registry led to the diagnoses at discharge in terms of ICD-9-CM codes.
Results

Overlap between Diagnosis Groups and Pharmacy-Based Cost Groups
Predictive Accuracy of the Models
Parameter Estimates
To mitigate gaming possibilities, 69 clinically homogeneous and identifiable diagnosis groups were clustered into 13 ''not clinically recognizable'' DCGs based on future additional costs (corrected for age, gender, and PCGs). The diagnosis groups for cancers account for 12.5% of the patients assigned to any of the 69 diagnosis groups and can be found in 11 of the 13 DCGs. Furthermore, the ''special medical procedures'' chemotherapy and radiotherapy account for about 3.5% of those patients assigned to a DCG.
The most expensive DCG (DCG13) consists of only the special medical procedure hemodialysis, which is more than three times as expensive as DCG12. This DCG13 accounts for about 10% of the future additional costs of all DCGs together. The special (Van Vliet and Prinsze 2003) . Thus, the self-employed seem to be in better health than the average enrollee or at least have lower medical consumption.
PCGs and DCGs seem to be complementary. About 60% of the patients who were assigned to a DCG would not receive a risk adjustment payment based on PCGs. Only a few patients were assigned to both a PCG and a DCG, and those patients appeared to have higher health expenditures than patients assigned to either a PCG or a DCG. The addition of DCGs to the PCG model nearly doubled the R 2 , from 11.5% to 22.8%. Importantly, DCGs improved in particular the predictive accuracy for inpatient expenses (from 4% to 15%), which apparently are poorly predicted by PCGs. As already noted, DCGs were introduced in the Dutch social health insurance sector in 2004 based on the research summarized here. Mandatory basic health insurance was expanded in 2006 to cover people who formerly were privately insured, thus abolishing the distinction between sickness funds and private health insurance companies. At the same time, the risk adjustment system from the social health insurance sector was expanded to cover 100% of the Dutch population. The core of this system is based on the PCG+DCG model developed and described in this paper, though some refinements and necessary alterations have been implemented since. 
Notes
